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INTRODUCTION 
 
In early war crimes trials such as in Nuremburg, documentary evidence 
was decisive in convicting the defendants. Witness evidence was of lesser 
importance.1 By contrast, in Bosnian war crimes trials the testimony of 
witnesses is essential, forming much of the evidential weight upon which the 
courts decisions are based.  If witnesses are not found or if they are unwilling 
or unable to give evidence in court, trials are unlikely to proceed. 
Witnesses in war crimes trials are often at the same time victims of the 
most horrific acts of brutality.  They are fearful and traumatised and are often 
reluctant to come to court and tell their story in public and in front of the 
accused.  Specific measures to protect and support witnesses and victims are 
employed to enable witnesses to give evidence in court.  They are designed to 
ensure their safety and to make the experience of testifying as minimally 
traumatic as possible. 
However, witness protection can conflict with the rights of the defendant 
to a fair trial.  The right to a fair trial includes the right of an accused to test 
his accuser through cross-examination in a public hearing.  Where witnesses 
are granted anonymity or the public is removed to protect the witnesses, or 
documentary hearsay evidence is accepted in place of oral evidence from a 
witness, a fair trial can be compromised. 
This article will focus on the use of protective measures in Bosnian war 
crimes trials at both the domestic War Crimes Chamber (WCC) in Sarajevo 
and at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
at The Hague The analysis will focus predominantly on the use of witness 
anonymity and the exclusion of the public from the trial chamber.  Both 
* Huma Haider (LLB, LLM, MBA) and Timothy Welch (LLB, LLM) worked in the 
Prosecution Support Section of the War Crimes Chamber, Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 2007. Huma is now a Research Fellow at the Governance and Social 
Development Resource Centre, University of Birmingham and Timothy has recently 
undertaken the Bar Vocational Course at the Inns of Court School of Law, London. 
1 Joanna Pozen, Justice Obscured: The Non-Disclosure of Witnesses Identities in 
ICTR Trials. See www.law.nyu.edu/ journals/jilp/issues/38/38_1_2_Pozen.pdf 
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measures have been widely used in the Bosnian trials, rendering the fairness 
of the proceedings controversial.   
In both courts, protective measures are provided for by law, just as due 
process and the rights of the defence are also fundamental requirements.  
Since the start of the Bosnian war crimes proceedings, both courts have 
struggled to strike a fair and appropriate balance between the interests of 
victims and the rights of the accused. 
Arguments justifying the use of restrictive measures to protect victims and 
witnesses often follow a common theme: war crimes trials are unique, taking 
place in exceptional circumstances. As such, departure from ordinary 
standards of due process is necessary.   
This article will look closely at the approach the courts have taken in 
balancing the interests of victims and the rights of the accused.  Additionally 
it will examine whether anonymity and the removal of the public is consistent 
with the fundamental right of fair trial under the European Convention on 
Human Rights.  Finally, the contention that war crimes trials in general take 
on a broader purpose than ordinary domestic criminal proceedings will be 
addressed by looking at the various aims which war crimes trials are said to 
have. 
 
ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND  
 
War broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in the early 1990’s 
following declarations of independence from Slovenia and Croatia and the 
subsequent break-up of Yugoslavia.  In March 1992, Bosnia had its own 
referendum for independence.  Bosnia has three main ethnic groups: Bosniaks 
(Bosnian Muslims), Croats and Serbs.  Croats and Muslims both participated 
in the referendum, whilst the majority of the Serbian population boycotted the 
vote.  In April 1992 the United Nations and the European Union officially 
recognised Bosnia as an independent state. Fighting broke out soon after.   
The conflict was long, widespread and brutal - and fought along ethnic lines. 
The scale and ferocity of the violence was something not seen in Europe since 
the Second World War.  The siege of Sarajevo, Bosnia’s capital, lasted for 
about four years, arguably making it the longest siege in modern military 
history.2  The mass killing of Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica was the 
2 C S King, The Siege of Sarajevo, 1992-1995 (part of Urban Operations: An 
Historical Casebook available at: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2002/urbanoperationsintro.htm.  
See also Study of the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo: final report of the United Nations 
Commission of Experts established pursuant to security council resolution 780 
(1992), S/1994/674/Add 2 (Vol II) 27 May 1994. 
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worst massacre and only genocide in Europe since 1945.3 The conflict 
affected almost the entire population in every part of the country.  It is 
estimated that between 150,000 and 250,000 people lost their lives.4     
The conflict also saw the displacement of an estimated 2.2 million people. 
This was not a byproduct of war, but its very purpose.5  It was part of the 
policy of “ethnic cleansing,” the term used to describe “the elimination by the 
dominant ethnic group of a given territory of members of other ethnic groups 
within that territory.”  
This was achieved in Bosnia through a variety of methods, including 
harassment, beatings, torture, rape, summary executions, forced relocation, 
confiscation of property and destruction of homes and places of worship and 
cultural institutions.6  Ultimately, “ninety percent of the pre-war Bosnian-Serb 
population left the area now called the Federation and over ninety-five percent 
of the pre-war Bosnian-Croat and Muslim inhabitants fled what would 
become the Republika Srpksa.”7
The war ended in 1995 with the signing of the General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in BiH, commonly known as the Dayton Peace 
Agreement.8  Following Dayton, Bosnia was and continues to be today an 
independent state, but under international administration.  However Bosnia is 
not the same country it was before the outbreak of war. The war has left the 
Bosnian people with widespread fear and mistrust of one another.  
Against this background, there was a clear need for a process of truth-
telling, rebuilding trust and reconciliation.  This would take many forms. It 
included a push to bring to justice those who had perpetrated the many 
horrific crimes that took place during the conflict. 
 
3 J W Honig and N Both Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1997). 
4 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), War Crimes Trials 
Before the Domestic Courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Progress and Obstacles 
(March 2005) p 3.  Bosnia currently has a population of approximately 3.8 million. 
Source: United Nations Statistics Division: Population and Vital Statistics Report. 
Series A Vol LIX No 2 1 July 2007 
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/vitstats/Sets/SeriesA_July2007_co
mplete.pdf). 
5 C Dahlman and G O Tuathail “The Legacy of Ethnic Cleansing: The International 
Community and the Returns Process in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina” (2005) 24 
Political Geography 569 at 573. 
6 UN Department of Public Information The UN and the Situation in the Former 
Yugoslavia (1995) at 65-66, in E Rosand “The Right to Return under International 
Law Following Mass Dislocation: The Bosnia Precedent?” (1997-1998) 19 Mich J 
Int’l L 1091 at 1098. 
7 Ibid n 6 at 1100. 
8 Signed in Dayton, Ohio on 14 December 1995.   
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This was a process that in fact began even before the end of the war.  On 
25 May 1993, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted 
Resolution 827,9 establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia. 
The ICTY was given jurisdiction to prosecute persons responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory 
of the former Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991.10  The Tribunal was given 
primacy over the jurisdiction of domestic courts to prosecute such offences11 
and the courts in Bosnia were obligated to provide unrestricted access to and 
cooperate with the Tribunal.12
The ICTY however, faced many difficulties in its early years and got off 
to a slow start.  The first trial13 did not commence until May 1996; a guilty 
verdict was returned on 7 May 1997.14 The Tribunal was initially constrained 
in its ability to investigate crimes because it started operating (i) whilst the 
war was still ongoing and intensifying (ii) with limited resources and (iii) 
without a police force and a witness protection program.15   
The ICTY has since made good progress.16 As of 12 February 2008, the  
Tribunal had concluded 111 cases out of a total of 161 indicted accused.17 As 
trials progressed at The Hague, and as more time elapsed since the end of the 
war, there was a push to conduct trials in Bosnia as well.  As remarked by 
Human Rights Watch, “fair and effective trials of the remaining perpetrators 
at the domestic level are necessary to further combat impunity in the former 
9 Adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  Available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/statut/S-RES-827_93.htm.   
10 Ibid at para 2. 
11 ICTY Statute Article 9 (2). 
12 Article II (8) General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH provides that; “All 
competent authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall cooperate with and provide 
unrestricted access to: any international human rights monitoring mechanisms 
established for Bosnia and Herzegovina; the supervisory bodies established by any of 
the international agreements listed in Annex I to this Constitution; the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (and in particular shall comply with orders issued 
pursuant to Article 29 of the Statute of the Tribunal); and any other organization 
authorized by the United Nations Security Council with a mandate concerning human 
rights or humanitarian law.” 
13 Dusko Tadić - Prosecutor v Tadić, No IT-94-1-T. 
14 Opinion and Judgment”, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić, Case No: IT-94-1-T, T Ch II, 7 
May 1997. 
15 Prosecutor v Tadić, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Protective Measures for 
Witnesses, IT-94-1-T, 10 August 1995 at paragraph 27. 
16 See Human Rights Watch, Real Progress in The Hague, 29 March 2005 available 
at http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/29/serbia10386.htm 
17 ICTY website: http://www.un.org/icty/glance-e/index.htm 
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Yugoslavia and build respect for the rule of law.”18 The new War Crimes 
Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina, situated in the Bosnian State Court in 
Sarajevo, was formally established in January 2005.19  The court has 
jurisdiction to try war crimes cases involving intermediary and lower-level 
accused20 transferred from the ICTY,21 and also holds territorial 
jurisdiction.22
The underlying principle of the WCC is that “accountability for the gross 
violations of human rights that took place during the conflict is of concern to 
all humanity but ultimately remains the responsibility of the people of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina themselves.”23 The court has a fully functioning Witness 
Protection Support Unit, offering witness support before, during and after 
hearings.24  The court also operates under measures designed to ensure that 
defendants receive a fair trial. The defendant’s rights and standards of due 
process are enshrined in the ECHR,25 which has been adopted in the Bosnian 
Constitution.26  
18 Human Rights Watch, Narrowing the Impunity Gap: Trials before Bosnia’s War 
Crimes Chamber (Feb 2007); p 1; See also section IV. Witness Protection and 
Support. 
19 War Crimes Chamber Project: Project Implementation Plan Registry Progress 
Report available at http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/rule-of-law-pillar/pdf/wcc-project-
plan-201004-eng.pdf 
20 Security Council Briefed on Establishment of War Crimes Chamber within State 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  UN Press Release SC/7888 October 8 2003 
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7888.doc.htm 
21 These will include cases under Rule 11 bis ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
which provides for the transfer of cases where an indictment has been confirmed.  
Additionally cases can be transferred by the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICTY 
where an indictment has not yet been confirmed. 
22 Chapter IV Bosnia & Herzegovina Criminal Procedure Code.  For an in depth 
discussion of the territorial jurisdiction of the Bosnian State Court, which has been 
controversial, see OSCE Report: War Crimes Trials Before the Domestic Courts of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Progress and Obstacles.  March 2005. 
23 Human Rights Watch, above n 18.  
24 Human Rights Watch, Looking for Justice: The War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina  (Feb 2006). See section V Witness Protection and Support. 
25 Article II of The Constitution of Bosnian & Herzegovina provides that: ‘The rights 
and freedoms set forth in the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols shall apply directly in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. These shall have priority over all other law.  Bosnia signed the ECHR 
on 24/04/2002; it was ratified on 12/07/2002 with immediate effect.  See 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=3&DF=2/
19/2008&CL=ENG. 
26 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
signed on December 14, 1995, Annex 4, The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
art. II(3)(e), http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=379 
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THE USE OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES AND THE BALANCE 
OF COMPETING INTERESTS TAKEN BY THE COURTS 
 
“In war crimes trials, as with any criminal case, the reliable and 
comprehensive testimony of witnesses is essential to a fair and 
effective procedure.”27
 
The question is - are war crimes trials akin to just ‘any criminal case’?  
Should victims and witnesses in such situations of conflict with extreme and 
widespread violations of human rights be afforded greater protections, even if 
potentially at the expense of the rights of the accused?  Or do such cases have 
a broader purpose for post-conflict societies and the international community 
that they must be held to strict standards of fair trial and rights of the accused? 
At the same time there is a considerable body of opinion which holds the view 
that the reliability of witness testimony can only be properly tested under 
cross examination.28 However, for witnesses’ testimony to be 
‘comprehensive’, witnesses need also to be willing and able to come forward 
and testify in safety and without fear.29  This debate concerning the rights of 
the accused and the rights of the victims and witnesses has played out in trials 
concerning the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina - at the ICTY and more 
recently at the WCC of the Bosnian State Court. 
 
(i) Anonymity  
 
Article 21 of the Statute of the ICTY, on the “Rights of the Accused” was 
adopted almost verbatim from Article 14 of the International Covenant on 
27 OSCE, above n 4 at 23. 
28  See Colin T McLaughlin “Victim and Witness Measures of the International 
Criminal Court: A Comparative Analysis” (2007) 6 The Law and Practice of 
International Courts and Tribunals 189 at 207; Monroe Leigh “Witness Anonymity is 
Inconsistent with Due Process” (1997) 91 The American Journal of International Law 
80 at 80-81; Human Rights Watch, above n 18 at 31; Pozen, above n 1 at 291; 
Vincent M Creta “The Search for Justice in the Former Yugoslavia and Beyond: 
Analyzing the Rights of the Accused under the Statute and the Rules of Evidence of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia” (1997-1998) 20 Hous 
J Int’l L 381 at 400. 
29 See Christine M Chinkin, “Due Process and Witness Anonymity” (1997) 91 The 
American Journal of International Law 75 at 76; Alex C Lakatos “Evaluating the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Tribunal in the Former 
Yugoslavia: Balancing Witnesses’ Needs Against Defendants’ Rights” (1994-1995) 
46 Hastings LJ 909 at 920-921; Jonathan Doak “The Victim and the Criminal 
Process: An Analysis of Recent Trends in Regional and International Tribunals” 
(2003) 23 Legal Studies 15 at 21. 
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Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  It specifies a number of minimum 
guarantees to which the accused is entitled, including the right “to examine, or 
have examined, the witnesses against him.”30  Article 21(2) states, “the 
accused shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing, subject to article 22 of 
the Statute.” Article 22 states that the Tribunal shall provide for protection of 
victims and witnesses with measures that “shall include, but shall not be 
limited to, the conduct of in camera proceedings and the protection of the 
victim’s identity.”31 The Statute differs from the ICCPR by qualifying the 
accused’s right.  Rule 69(A) of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
explains further: “In exceptional circumstances, the Prosecutor may apply to a 
Judge or Trial Chamber to order the non-disclosure of the identity of a victim 
or witness who may be in danger or at risk until such person is brought under 
the protection of the Tribunal.” 
In Prosecutor v Tadić, the first case to be tried (whilst the war was 
ongoing) at the ICTY – the majority opinion in the Protective Measures 
Decision stated: “A fair trial means not only fair treatment to the defendant 
but also to the prosecution and to the witnesses.”32 Judge McDonald argued 
that by including an “affirmative obligation to protect victims and witnesses” 
the drafters of the Statute recognised the “unique” context of the ICTY.  This 
context entailed operating during a continuing conflict and without a witness 
protection programme.33   
The prosecution’s main protective measures included anonymity, whereby 
victims and witnesses would not be identified to the accused or to his lawyers; 
and confidentiality, whereby victims and witnesses would not be identified to 
the public and the media.34 The majority granted anonymity to four witnesses 
and confidentiality to many more.35  In so doing, it emphasised the need to 
balance interests: “On the one hand, there is some constraint to cross-
examination, which can be substantially obviated by the procedural 
safeguards. On the other hand, the Trial Chamber has to protect witnesses 
who are genuinely frightened.”36 The judgment provided five guidelines on 
how to balance these interests with respect to granting witness anonymity:   
 
30 Article 21(4)(e), Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia; see Antonio Cassese, “The International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia and Human Rights” (1997) 2 European Human Rights Law 
Review 329 at 333. 
31 Article 22, Statute of the ICTY. 
32 Tadić, above n 15 at para 55. 
33 Ibid at paras 26-27. 
34 Natasha A Affolder “Tadić, the Anonymous Witness and the Sources of 
International Procedural Law” (1997-1998) 19 Mich. J Int’l L 445 at 452. 
35 Tadić, above  n 15 at paras 84-85 and disposition. 
36 Ibid, at para 84. 
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 “First and foremost, there must be real fear for the safety of the 
witness or her or his family … Secondly, the testimony of the 
particular witness must be important to the Prosecutor's case … 
Thirdly, the Trial Chamber must be satisfied that there is no prima 
facie evidence that the witness is untrustworthy … Fourthly, the 
ineffectiveness or non-existence of a witness protection programme is 
another point that has been considered in domestic law and has a 
considerable bearing on any decision to grant anonymity in this case 
… Finally, any measures taken should be strictly necessary.”37
 
Applying these five factors, and considering the ongoing-armed conflict to 
be an “exceptional circumstance par excellence,” the majority opinion 
concluded that anonymous testimony is consistent with the ICTY’s Statute 
and Rules of Procedure and Evidence.38
While agreeing with other majority protective measures granted, Judge 
Stephen was strongly opposed to anonymity.  He stressed that the 
qualification in Article 21(2) must apply solely to “the public quality of the 
hearing and not its fairness.”39  In examining Article 22, he relied on the 
Secretary-General’s Report, which when introducing the article, refers to the 
need for protection measures “especially in cases of rape and sexual 
assault.”40  In such cases, Judge Stephen stated that protection is needed not 
because witnesses in such cases have a greater fear of retaliation, but because 
of the potential negative social consequences of it being known in 
communities that one was raped; combined with retraumatisation from facing 
one’s attacker in court.  He noted that the customary measures for these are in 
camera proceedings and careful control of cross-examination. As such, he 
concludes that it is such measures, and “not any wholesale anonymity of 
witnesses,” that Article 22 addresses.41 Wholesale anonymity, he asserted, 
would violate the accused’s right to examine witnesses – and ultimately, the 
right of the accused to a fair hearing. The accuser, he stressed, “would appear 
as no more than a disembodied and distorted voice transmitted by electronic 
means” – yet his or her testimony could be used as evidence to convict the 
accused on very serious charges.42
37 Ibid, at para 62-66. 
38 Ibid, at para 61 and 57-59. 
39 Prosecutor v Tadić, Separate Opinion of Judge Stephen on the Prosecutor’s Motion 
Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses (10 August 1995). 
40 Ibid; see Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security 
Council Resolution 808 (1993) (S/25704) at para 108. 
41 Ibid Judge Stephen. 
42 Ibid; see also Affolder, above n 34, at 461. 
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Human rights commentators and NGOs have also critiqued the use of 
anonymity.43  They assert that non-disclosure of the identity of accusing 
witnesses prevents the accused from conducting background searches of the 
witness; and prevents the accused from properly preparing for and effectively 
conducting cross-examination.44 Further, anonymity precludes the accused 
from challenging the reliability of the witness’ testimony based on the 
accused’s personal knowledge of the situation and the person involved; and 
based on monitoring the witness in court.45  As such, critics consider 
anonymity to be a violation of the right of the accused to a fair trial. 
Since Tadić, the ICTY has moved in the direction of Judge Stephen’s 
dissent – and has not granted any further complete witness anonymity 
measures.  Although the Trial Chamber adopted the five guidelines laid out in 
Tadić in a subsequent case, Prosecutor v Blaškić, it applied a more restrictive 
interpretation of them.  Its approach was more favourable to the accused:   
 
“[T]he victims and witnesses merit protection, even from the accused, 
during the preliminary proceedings and continuing until a reasonable 
time before the start of the trial itself; from that time forth, however, 
the right of the accused to an equitable trial must take precedence and 
require that the veil of anonymity be lifted in his favour, even if the 
veil must continue to obstruct the view of the public and the media.”46
 
By distinguishing between the periods before and after the 
commencement of a trial, the Chamber acknowledged the need for the 
accused to know the identities of witnesses in sufficient time in order to 
prepare for cross-examination.47  This progression in ICTY jurisprudence is 
logical given the development of the Tribunal’s witness protection 
programme, which had been absent at the time of Tadić.48  The Chamber also 
found that the “fundamental exceptional circumstance” - an ongoing-armed 
conflict in central Bosnia, which could justify the granting of anonymity to 
one or more witnesses, no longer existed.49  As a result of these findings, the 
Chamber denied the non-disclosure request by the Prosecution and ordered 
the prosecutor to give the defence, unredacted copies of the statements of 
43 Leigh, above n 28 at 80-81; Human Rights Watch, above n 24 at 31. 
44 Ibid; see also McLaughlin, above n 28 at 207.  
45 McLaughlin, ibid; and Doak, above n 29 at 17. 
46 Prosecutor v Blaškić, Case; Decision on the Application of the Prosecutor dated 17 
October 1996 requesting protective measures for victims and witnesses, Case no. IT-
95-14-PT, 5 November 1996, paragraph 24; cited in 3 March 2000 Judgment, IT-95-
14-PT, paragraph 50.  
47 Pozen, above n 1 at 294. 
48 Ibid. 
49  Prosecutor v Blaškić, above n 46. 
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witnesses.50  It did, however, order that the defense must not disclose the 
information publicly51 and granted special protection to some of the 
witnesses.52
The Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v Brđanin and Talić also disallowed the 
Prosecution’s redaction of names in all the statements of witnesses. It 
concluded that:  
 
“[T]he prevailing circumstances within the former Yugoslavia cannot 
by themselves amount to exceptional circumstances. This Tribunal has 
always been concerned solely with the former Yugoslavia, and 
Rule 69(A) was adopted by the judges against a background of ethnic 
and political enmities which existed in the former Yugoslavia at that 
time. The Tribunal was able to frame its Rules to fit the task at hand 
… [T]o be exceptional, the circumstances must therefore go beyond 
what has been, since before the Tribunal was established.”53   
 
The Chamber was not satisfied that there had been any such significant 
change, which would allow for these anonymity measures. It also emphasised 
that there can be no blanket anonymity, as this would presume that every 
witness is “in danger or at risk” (as Rule 69(A) describes them), or 
“vulnerable.”54  The Chamber set out three criteria for deciding whether 
delayed disclosure requests under Rule 69(A) should be granted.  These 
criteria were cited with approval in Prosecutor v Stanišić and Simatović; and 
again in Prosecutor v Perišić:  
 
a)“the likelihood that Prosecution witness will be interfered with or 
intimidated once their identity is made known to the accused and his 
counsel, but not to the public,  
 
b) the distinction which must be drawn between measures to protect 
individual victims and witnesses in the particular trial, which are 
50 Prosecutor v Blaškić Case No IT-94-1, Decision of Trial Chamber I on the 
Applications of the Prosecutor, 24 June and 30 August 1996 in Respect of the 
Protection of Witnesses, 2 October 1996. 
51 Prosecutor v Blaškić Case No IT-94-1, 19 September 1996, 2 October 1996.  
52 Prosecutor v Blaškić Case No IT-94-1, 5 November 1996, 6 May 1998.  
53 Prosecutor v Brdanin and Talić Case No: IT-99-36, Decision on Motion by 
Prosecution for Protective Measures (ICTY Trial Chamber 3 July 2000) paragraph 11. 
54 Ibid at paras 11, 16-17.  The Chamber rejected the prosecution’s argument that the 
“exceptional circumstances” was an inherent feature of the post-war landscape, 
justifying non-disclosure (paragraph 20); see also Cristian DeFrancia “Due Process in 
International Criminal Courts: Why Procedure Matters”  (2001) 87 Virginia Law 
Review 1381 at 1419. 
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permissible under the Rules, and measures which simply make it 
easier for the Prosecution to bring cases against other persons in the 
future, which are not, and  
 
c) the length of time before the trial at which the identity of the 
victims and witnesses must be disclosed to the accused.”55 
 
In Perišić, the Chamber concluded that the Prosecutor must give the 
defence a reasonable time to properly prepare for cross-examination. It 
confirmed that this requires full disclosure of the identities and statements of 
witnesses to be given no later than 30 days before the trial – consistent with 
the general practice of the Chamber.56
The ICTY has made a marked move in its jurisprudence away from total 
anonymity from the accused. However, this does not necessarily mean that 
this remedy is a “dead letter.”57  Rather, the prospect of anonymity continues 
with every war crimes prosecution, given the “unusual dangers” faced by 
witnesses in such cases and the “limited ability” to protect them.58   
In addition, many war crimes prosecutions involve cases of rape and 
sexual assault – for which special protections of witnesses are imperative. As 
discussed, the Secretary General’s report – cited in Tadić, stressed that 
protection should be granted especially in such cases.  The Chamber in Tadić 
also noted that rape and sexual assault could have a permanent detrimental 
impact on the victim.59 As such, decisions on protective measures cannot be 
based on a continuum focusing on the absence or presence of an armed 
conflict or on the degree of stability in the former Yugoslavia. Protections 
advocated for victims of rape and sexual assault usually centre upon 
excluding the public;60 however, it is also recognised that victims of sexual 
violence in particular can be retraumatised through confrontation with the 
55 Prosecutor v Perišić, Case No: IT-04-81, Decision on Prosecution Motion for 
Protective Measures for Witnesses (ICTY Trial Chamber 27 May 2005) citing 
Prosecutor v Stanisic and Simatovic, "Decision on Confidential Prosecution Motions 
for Protective Measures", Case No IT-03-69-PT, 26 October 2004 citing Prosecutor v 
Brdjanin & Talic, "Decision on Motion by Prosecution for Protective Measures", 
Case No IT-99-36-PT, 3 July 2000, para 26-38. 
56 Ibid, Perišić. 
57 See Gregory S Gordon “Toward an International Criminal Procedure: Due Process 
Aspirations and Limitations” (2007) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 635 at 
695 and DeFrancia, above n 54 at 1420.   
58 Ibid, Gordon.  
59 Tadić, above n 15 at para 46. See also Doak, above n 29 at 21. 
60 It has been noted that testifying about rape and sexual assault is particularly 
difficult in public, and can result in rejection by the victim’s family and community. 
See Tadić, above n 15 at para 46. 
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accused in trial.  As such, they may refuse to testify unless granted 
anonymity.61
Further, although anonymity has not yet been a key issue in the War 
Crimes Chamber  of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there may be 
greater potential for it to arise at the WCC and at other war crimes trials in the 
country.62 As will be discussed below, it could be argued that the “unusual 
dangers” and “limited ability to protect” are more pronounced in war crimes 
trials in Bosnia.  As such, two of the determining factors in the majority 
judgment in Tadić - “exceptional circumstances” and the absence of a witness 
protection programme could re-emerge in these trials. 
The application and interpretation of “exceptional circumstances” by the 
ICTY has been outlined above; however, there are additional factors that 
require consideration in present day Bosnia. An OSCE report from 2005 
describes the way in which the situation has changed for many witnesses in 
the context of refugee and displaced person return:   
 
“Many witnesses now live in an environment different to the one in 
which they originally gave evidence to the police or prosecutors.  
Many gave statements to judges, police and prosecutors of their own 
ethnicity shortly after the event or after the war.  In may cases, the 
same people then moved abroad or to a community in BiH dominated 
by members of their own ethnic group.  They did not foresee the time 
when the suspect or the suspect’s family would become their 
neighbour once more or that they would be living in neighbouring 
communities with full and unchecked freedom of movement …  
Feedback from OSCE trial monitors indicates that, especially in cases 
where defendants are powerful political figures or businessmen, 
ordinary citizens feel intimidated to act as witnesses.”63
 
The report notes further the difficulties that prosecutors’ offices face in 
getting witnesses to come to court, particularly returnees whose families are 
61 See McLaughlin, above n 28 at 206; and Lakatos, above n 29 at 920. 
62 Law on Protection of Witnesses Under Threat and Vulnerable Witnesses, “Official 
Gazette” of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No 3/03: Article 12: Limitation of the right of 
an accused and his defense attorney to inspect files and documentation, (1) In 
exceptional circumstances, if revealing some or all of the personal details of a witness 
or other details would contribute to identifying a witness, and would seriously 
endanger the witness under threat, the preliminary proceedings judge may, upon the 
motion of the Prosecutor, decide that some or all of the personal details of a witness, 
may continue to be kept confidential after the indictment is issued.  
63 OSCE, above n 4 at 23-24.  The report notes that during the Konjic 7 proceedings at 
the Mostar Cantonal Court, a number of prosecution witnesses reneged on their 
original statements. 
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living in the entity, canton or village in which they are now a minority.  They 
note that retaliatory measures may go beyond social exclusion and social 
stigma to more violent actions.64
Regarding witness protection programmes, although the War Crimes 
Chamber has a solid programme in place,65 challenges remain.  These stem 
from the general concerns related to conducting trials in the location where 
the crimes occurred; and difficulties with concealing the identity of witnesses 
in a small country.66  Of much concern as well is the safety of witnesses 
giving testimony at war crimes trials at entity and cantonal courts. While 
protection systems may be sufficient at the state court level, witness 
protection measures at the sub-state level remain minimal and weak.67     
Thus, while more recent jurisprudence of war crimes trials concerning 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has not granted witness anonymity, there is still the 
potential for such measures to become an issue again in future trials.   
 
(ii)  Exclusion of the Public   
 
Article 20(4) of the ICTY Statute states that “hearings shall be public 
unless the Trial Chamber decides to close the proceedings in accordance with 
its rules of procedure and evidence.”  In Tadić, the Chamber recognised this 
preference for a public hearing; and the benefits of press and public access in 
helping to ensure a fair trial. However, it added that this requirement had to be 
“balanced with other mandated interests, such as the duty to protect victims 
and witnesses.”68  Rule 75 provides for various measures to shield a witness 
from the view of the public and/or the accused, including expunging 
identifying information from public records; image- or voice-altering devices 
or closed circuit television; or closed sessions.  Closed sessions, which 
exclude the press and public, can be ordered by the Chamber for reasons of 
safety, security or non-disclosure of the identity of a victim or witness; public 
order or morality; and the protection of the interests of justice.69 They are 
often used in cases involving rape and sexual assault in order to make it easier 
for victims to speak about these sensitive and distressing matters; and to 
protect victims from rejection by their family and community.  
In addition to protecting victims and witnesses from the public and media, 
such measures can be further beneficial in that they are much less intrusive to 
64 Ibid, at 26. 
65 Human Rights Watch discusses favourably the Witness Protection Unit and the 
Witness Support Office of the State Court in promoting the safety and well-being of 
witnesses; see Human Rights Watch, above n 24 at 29) 
66 Ibid. 
67 See OSCE, above n 4 at 26-28. 
68 Tadić, above n 15, para 32-33. 
69 Rule 79, ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
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the right of the accused to a fair trial than anonymity.  They allow for the 
accused to know the identity of the witness and to fully prepare cross-
examination.70
Under Bosnian law, there is also a presumption that trials will be public – 
as specified in Article 234(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) of 
BiH.71 The CPC also allows for exceptions under Article 235.  The public can 
be excluded at any time during the main trial “if it is to protect the public 
peace and order, to preserve morality in the democratic society, to protect the 
personal and intimate life of the accused or the injured or to protect the 
interest of a minor or a witness.”72   The Court has allowed a number of closed 
sessions, under this provision, which has been criticised.73
In Prosecutor v Samardžić, the Court recognised that a “public hearing is 
an essential feature of the right to a fair trial.” However, it decided to allow 
the Prosecutor’s motion to close the main trial to the general public and press 
in order to protect the interests of the victims and witnesses.74  Many of the 
witnesses were women who were to testify about rapes and other humiliating 
treatment, some of who were minors and children at the time of the offence or 
the hearing.   The Court found that testifying about such matters in public is a 
risk to the personal and intimate life of witnesses; their identity could be 
deduced from the subject matter of their testimony, even if protective 
measures such as screen and voice distortion were used.  In addition, the 
Court considered that such testimony in public could be a risk to other victims 
should the witnesses mention their names during the proceedings.75
In Prosecutor v Stanković, the Court decided pursuant to Article 235 to 
close the entire main trial to the public as a rule.  Ultimately, some exceptions 
were made during the Prosecutor’s presentation of evidence; and after hearing 
the witnesses for the Prosecution, the continuation of the main trial was 
70 McLaughlin, above n 28 at 199. 
71 “Official Gazette” of Bosnia and Herzegovina, No 3/03; Criminal Procedure Code 
(CPC) Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
72 Article 235 of the CPC also allows for exclusion of the public if “in the interest of 
the national security, or if it is necessary to preserve a national, military, official or 
important business secret.”  
73 Human Rights Watch, above n 18 at 31. 
74 Prosecutor v Samardžić, Case No. X-KR-05/49, Decision of First Instance of 7 
April 2006, pp 8-9.  The main trial was closed to the public from 6 March 2006 and 
reopened on 30 March 2006.  Another reason given by the Court for closing the trials 
was that the witnesses could give the names of other alleged perpetrators linked to the 
crimes of rape and sexual slavery. 
75 Ibid, at 9; The ICTY in Tadić had also recognised that the special concerns of 
victims of sexual assault must be considered in deciding whether to allow for closed 
sessions.   
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public, except for when discussing protected witnesses.76  The witnesses in 
Stanković also testified about a large number of rapes and other humiliating 
treatment.  The decision to close the trial was based on the need to preserve 
morality and, as in Samardžić, to protect the personal and intimate life of 
injured parties; and other victims and witnesses.77 In addition, there were 
concerns that Stanković would disclose to the public the identities and 
addresses of the witnesses for the Prosecution, which he had threatened to do 
before the ICTY.78
In both these cases, the Court allowed for representatives of the OSCE 
and other international institutions to attend the closed sessions, pursuant to 
Article 236 of the CPC.79  Still, the broad use of closed sessions has been a 
concern.  A report by Human Rights Watch emphasises that the right to a 
public trial is one of the fundamental safeguards of criminal procedure80 and 
questions the need to exclude the public.  
Other human rights commentators and NGOs have also critiqued the 
exclusion of the public and its potential to result in a violation of the rights of 
the accused.  While closed sessions and non-disclosure of witness identities to 
the public does not threaten the right of the accused to cross-examination, the 
absence of public scrutiny could allow for witnesses to give false or 
misleading testimony.81  The importance of public scrutiny of trial testimony 
in deterring such false or misleading testimony is a key reason why the 
accused’s right to a public trial is considered a fundamental safeguard of 
criminal procedure and fairness.82  Further, the right to a public hearing is 
expressly provided for by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), as discussed in the following section.  
 
ECHR COMPATIBILITY  
To what extent then are the rules and procedure of the WCC compatible 
with the rules of criminal procedure as laid down in the ECHR which Bosnia 
has signed and ratified?  
76 Prosecutor v Stanković, Case No X-KR-05/70, Decision of First Instance of 14 
November 2006, pp 12-13. 
77 Ibid. The Court also cited as a reason for closing the trials that the witnesses could 
give the names of other alleged perpetrators linked to the crimes of rape and sexual 
slavery. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Article 236 of the CPC provides for “Persons to Whom Exclusion of the Public Is 
Not Applicable”.  
80 See ICCPR, art 14(1); ECHR, art 6(1); Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), adopted December 10, 1948, GA Res. 217A(III), UN Doc A/810 at 71 
(1948), art 11), cited in Human Rights Watch, above n 17 at 32. 
81 Pozen, above n 1 at 291; Human Rights Watch, above n 18 at 31. 
82 Pozen, ibid; Creta, above n 28 at 400. 
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(i) Anonymity 
 
Article 6 ECHR provides that: 
 
 “Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following 
minimum rights:  to examine or have examined witnesses against him 
and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his 
behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him…”83
 
This provision has been subject to the Strasbourg Court’s interpretation on 
a number of occasions,84 however the court has not always been consistent in 
its interpretation.  The Law Commission of England and Wales observed that 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence in this area of the law is “difficult to predict with 
confidence”85 and another commentator described the cases as “impossible to 
reconcile with each other.”86  While this may be true to a degree there are 
nevertheless principles that can be extracted from the court’s rulings when 
taken as a whole. Further these principles are applicable to the use of 
anonymous witnesses in criminal trials. To date however there are no 
Strasbourg cases on Article 6 (3) that address the use of witness anonymity in 
war crimes trials.   
The arguments both for and against the use of anonymous witnesses in 
cases involving serious breaches of international human rights law are often 
of a greater intensity than is normally the case in domestic legal proceedings.  
This can complicate any prediction as to how the Strasbourg authorities would 
approach or rule in a case involving war crimes, particularly given the 
inconsistency in its jurisprudence to date. Nevertheless the basic legal 
framework of course remains the same. 
The Strasbourg court has ruled in a number of cases that the constituent 
rights in Article 6 are not in themselves absolute and its interpretation is 
primarily a matter for the national authorities.87  In Luca v Italy88 the court 
83 Article 6 (3) (d) European Convention on Human Rights.  
84 The word witness has been interpreted to included a person who has made a formal 
statement to the police, which the prosecution has then put in evidence at trial; 
Kostovski v The Netherlands (1990) 12 EHRR 434, para 40; Delta v France (1993) 16 
EHRR 574, para 34; Artner v Austria (1992) Series A No 242, para 19; and Windisch 
v Austria (1991) 13 EHRR 281, para 23. 
85 Law Commission No 245, Hearsay and Related Matters 1997 (Report No 245); 
available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/lc245.pdf at para 5.1. 
86 W O’Brian “The Right of Confrontation: US and European Perspectives” (2005) 
121 Law Quarterly Review 481.
87 See for example Edwards v United Kingdom (1992) 15 EHRR 417, paras 33-34; 
Miailhe v France (No 2) (1996) 23 EHRR 491, para 43; Rowe and Davis v United 
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held that “The admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter for regulation by 
national law and as a general rule it is for the national courts to assess the 
evidence before them. The Court's task under the Convention is not to give a 
ruling as to whether statements of witnesses were properly admitted as 
evidence, but rather to ascertain whether the proceedings as a whole, 
including the way in which evidence was taken, were fair.”89
Article 6 (3) (d) is expressly focused on the right of the defence to ask 
questions or confront witnesses. Witness anonymity will prevent or restrict 
the defence from challenging a witness’s evidence sufficiently, but a number 
of Strasbourg cases indicate that it is the confrontation rather than the 
anonymity with which the court is primarily concerned. 
In Kostovski v Netherlands90 the applicant was convicted on the basis of 
evidence provided by anonymous witnesses and was additionally denied the 
opportunity to put questions in cross examination.  The court held that the 
rights of the defence to confrontation under Article 6 had been restricted and 
the anonymity issue had “compounded the difficulties faced by the applicant”. 
91 Significantly the court observed: 
 
“If the defence is unaware of the identity of the person it seeks to 
question, it may be deprived of the very particulars enabling it to 
demonstrate that he or she is prejudiced, hostile or unreliable. 
Testimony or other declarations inculpating an accused may well be 
designedly untruthful or simply erroneous and the defence will 
scarcely be able to bring this to light if it lacks the information 
permitting it to test the author's reliability or cast doubt on his 
credibility.  The dangers inherent in such a situation are obvious”92
 
However the court also made clear that this is not absolute and there can 
be exceptions even where there has been confrontation:  
 
“These rights require, as a rule, that an accused be given, at some 
stage in the proceedings, an adequate and proper opportunity to 
challenge and question a witness against him.”93   
 
Kingdom (2000) 30 EHRR 1, para 59. Adolf v Austria (1982) 4 EHRR 313, 324-325, 
para 36, where the Court, citing Guzzardi v Italy (1980) 3 EHRR 333, 361, para 88, 
and X v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 188, 202, para 41; Salabiaku v France 
(1988) 13 EHRR 379. 
88 Luca v Italy (2003) 36 EHRR 46. 
89 Ibid, at H 6 (b). 
90 Kostovski v Netherlands (1990) 12 EHRR 434. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid, at para 42. 
93 Ibid, at para 41. 
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It is questionable however that, even where there is an opportunity to 
challenge an anonymous witness, it can be considered ‘adequate and proper’ 
given the difficulties outlined in Kostovski,94 with which the defence are 
faced. 
The Strasbourg court will also evaluate the weight attached to evidence 
from anonymous witnesses and the extent to which a conviction is based on 
such evidence in determining whether the defendant’s rights under Article 6 
(3) are restricted.  In Windsch v Austria95 the court found a violation of 
Article 6 where the applicant’s conviction was based “to a large extent”96 on 
statements made by anonymous witnesses to the police.  Here the court 
observed that “the right to a fair administration of justice hold so prominent in 
democratic society that it cannot be sacrificed.”97 
In Unterpertinger v Austria98 the court found a violation of Article 6 (3) 
where the applicant was convicted ‘mainly’ on statements of witnesses who 
did not attend court.  This decision is difficult to reconcile with the later ruling 
in Artner v Austria.99 In both cases there were absent witnesses with 
corroborating medical evidence, but in Artner no violation was found. Three 
dissenting judges in Artner viewed the cases as indistinguishable.100
In Luca v Italy101 the court held that:  
 
“where a conviction is based solely or to a decisive degree [emphasis 
added] on depositions that have been made by a person whom the 
accused has had no opportunity to examine or to have examined, 
whether during the investigation or at the trial, the rights of the 
defence are restricted to an extent that is incompatible with the 
guarantees provided by Art 6.”102   
 
While the words “to a large extent” and “mainly” were used in Windsch103 
and Unterpertinger,104 Luca105 uses ‘solely or to a decisive degree’. However, 
94 Ibid, at 90. 
95 Windisch v Austria (1991) 13 EHRR 281. 
96 Ibid, at para 31. 
97 Ibid, at para 30. 
98 Unterpertinger v Austria (1991) 13 EHRR 175. 
99 Artner v Austria (1992) Series A No 342. 
100 Ibid. The decision was based on a five to four vote and provoked a strong dissent.  
See Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Walsh, Macdonald and Palm who held that 
without the use of the statements no conviction could have been obtained. 
101 Luca v Italy (2003) 36 EHRR 46. 
102 Luca v Italy (2003) 36 EHRR 46 at H 8 (d). 
103 Windisch v Austria (1991) 13 EHRR 281. 
104 Unterpertinger v Austria (1991) 13 EHRR 175. 
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in Ludi v Switzerland106 it was enough that the evidence “played a part” in the 
conviction.107  In the more recent case of Krasniki v Czech Republic108 a 
conviction based solely on the evidence of anonymous witnesses was not 
considered unsafe, but the court held the need for anonymity must be clearly 
established.  These cases are slightly confusing, leaving the correct position 
difficult to predict with certainty. What is clear it that the court has made a 
significant departure from the language used in the text of Article 6 itself, 
which states very clearly the “minimum rights” to which the defendant is 
entitled. 
The Strasbourg court has, however, emphasised that for restrictive 
measures to be applied, they must be “strictly necessary” to be permissible 
under Article 6.109  The court will look to strike a balance between competing 
interests, and in a number of cases has held that where the defendant’s rights 
are limited, this must be strictly necessary and done by the least restrictive 
means possible to achieve a given aim. 
In Ludi v Switzerland,110 the court found that the applicant’s conviction, 
based on unchallenged evidence given by anonymous police agents, was 
disproportionate.  It was not their anonymity per se which the court found 
impermissible, but that the defence had not been given the opportunity to put 
questions to the witnesses.  The court held that “it would have been possible 
to do this in a way which took into account the legitimate interest of the police 
authorities in a drug trafficking case in preserving the anonymity of their 
agent, so that they could protect him and also make use of him again in the 
future.”111
In Saidi v France112 the applicant was denied requests to confront 
anonymous police officers and was convicted under dangerous drugs 
legislation.  The Respondent argued that “the protection of witnesses takes 
priority and their legitimate interest in remaining anonymous must be 
protected, so as to strengthen measures to combat drug trafficking.”113  This 
argument, clearly having little regard for due process and ‘minimum rights 
alike, was rightly rejected by the court which held it was “fully aware of the 
undeniable difficulties of the fight against drug-trafficking particular with 
regard to obtaining and producing evidence and of the ravages caused to 
 
105 Luca v Italy (2003) 36 EHRR 46. 
106 Ludi v Switzerland (1993) 15 EHRR 173 
107 W O’Brian “The Right of Confrontation: US and European Perspectives” (2005) 
121 Law Quarterly Review 481.
108 Krasniki v Czech Republic (Application No 51277/99). 
109 PS v Germany (2003) 36 EHRR 61; [2002] Crim LR 312. 
110 Above n 107. 
111 Ludi v Switzerland (1993) 15 EHRR 173 at paragraph 49. 
112 Saidi v France (1994) 17 EHRR 251. 
113 Ibid, at para 33. 
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society by the drug problem, but such considerations cannot justify restricting 
to this extent the rights of the defence of  “everyone charged with a criminal 
offence”114
Nevertheless in the later case of Van Mechelen v Netherlands115 the court 
recognised that there can be special categories of witnesses and that the 
“balancing of the interests of the defence against arguments in favour of 
maintaining the anonymity of the witnesses raises special problems if the 
witnesses in question are members of the police force of the state.”116  Such 
witnesses’ interest in remaining anonymous is, the court held, “to some extent 
different from that of disinterested witnesses or victims.”117 Particular regard 
was given to the preservation of undercover agents and the protection of their 
families.118
The court did however reiterate the importance of the right to a fair 
administration of justice in a democratic society, and that any measures 
restricting the rights of the defence should be strictly necessary – “if a less 
restrictive measure can suffice then that measure should be applied.”  Here 
the defence was unaware of the identity of the police witnesses and was also 
prevented from direct questioning.  The court viewed this as disproportionate 
and held that “it has not been explained to the Court's satisfaction why it was 
necessary to resort to such extreme limitations on the right of the accused to 
have the evidence against them given in their presence, or why less far-
reaching measures were not considered.”119 A violation of Article 6 was thus 
found. 
 
(ii) The Rights of Witnesses  
 
Another important issue for which the Strasbourg authorities will have 
regard when assessing the permissibility of witness anonymity, is the 
Convention rights of the witnesses themselves.120  
In Doorson v Netherlands,121 the court found there was sufficient reason 
to maintain the anonymity of drug addicts giving evidence against drug 
dealers and concluded that “drug dealers frequently resorted to threats and 
114 Ibid, at para 44. 
115 Van Mechelen v Netherlands (1998) 25 EHRR 647. 
116 Ibid, at para 2. 
117 Ibid, at para 56. 
118 Ibid, at para 56. 
119 Ibid, at para 60. 
120 Article 2 ECHR provides ‘Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No 
one shall be deprived of his life…’ and Article 8 ECHR provides ‘Everyone has the 
right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.’ 
121 Doorson v Netherlands (1996) 22 EHRR 330. 
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actual violence against persons who gave evidence against them.”122  
Significantly the court observed that: 
 
“It is true that Article 6 does not explicitly require the interests of 
witnesses in general, and those of victims called upon to testify in 
particular, to be taken into consideration. However, their life, liberty 
or security of person may be at stake, as may interests coming 
generally within the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention. Such 
interests of witnesses and victims are in principle protected by other, 
substantive provisions of the Convention, which imply that 
Contracting States should organise their criminal proceedings in such 
a way that those interests are not unjustifiably imperilled. Against this 
background, principles of fair trial also require that in appropriate 
cases the interests of the defence are balanced against those of 
witnesses or victims called upon to testify.”123
 
Although the court accepted that the anonymity of the witnesses 
“presented the defence with difficulties which criminal proceedings should 
not normally involve…” it held that “nevertheless, no violation of Article 6 
(1) taken together with Article 6 (3) (d) of the Convention can be found if it is 
established that the handicaps under which the defence laboured were 
sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures followed by the judicial 
authorities.”124 Here the court found that the questioning of the anonymous 
witnesses “at the appeals stage in the presence of counsel by an investigating 
judge who was aware of their identity”125 was a sufficient counterbalancing 
procedure.126 Of course these cases cited in the Strasbourg jurisprudence 
relate to domestic violence, drug dealing and other ordinary domestic offences 
and not to war crimes. 
However, the test for compatibility of witness anonymity with Convention 
rights as established by the ECHR was adopted by the ICTY in Prosecutor v 
Tadić.127  The Tribunal in Tadić evaluated and distinguished the Kostovski128 
decision which the Tribunal viewed as “not directly on point, as it does not 
relate to the testimony of unidentified witnesses who will be present in court, 
whose evidence will be subject to cross-examination, and whose demeanour is 
being observed by the Judges of the Trial Chamber.”129   
122 Ibid, at para 71. 
123 Ibid, at para 70. 
124 Ibid, at para 73. 
125 Ibid, at para 73. 
126 Ibid, at para 73. 
127 Prosecutor  v Tadić. No IT-94-1-T. 
128 Kostovski v Netherlands (1990) 12 EHRR 434. 
129 Tadić, above n 14 at para 68. 
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The Tribunal also found that Kostovski130 does provide that “procedural 
safeguards can be adopted to ensure that a fair trial takes place when the 
identity of the witness is not disclosed to the accused.”131  The following 
guidelines were stated by the Tribunal to achieve this purpose: 
 
“Firstly, the Judges must be able to observe the demeanour of the 
witness, in order to assess the reliability of the testimony. Secondly, 
the Judges must be aware of the identity of the witness, in order to test 
the reliability of the witness. Thirdly, the defence must be allowed 
ample opportunity to question the witness on issues unrelated to his or 
her identity or current whereabouts, such as how the witness was able 
to obtain the incriminating information but still excluding information 
that would make the true name traceable. The release of nicknames 
used in the camps clearly falls into this latter category and the 
majority of the Trial Chamber will therefore not allow the release of 
this information concerning witnesses who have been granted 
anonymity without the express consent of these witnesses. Finally, the 
identity of the witness must be released when there are no longer 
reasons to fear for the security of the witness.”132
 
The Tribunal also attempted to distinguish trials in a war crimes context: 
 
“The interpretations of Article 6 of the ECHR by the European Court 
of Human Rights are meant to apply to ordinary criminal and, for 
Article 6 (1), civil adjudications. By contrast, the International 
Tribunal is adjudicating crimes which are considered so horrific as to 
warrant universal jurisdiction. The International Tribunal is, in certain 
respects, comparable to a military tribunal, which often has limited 
rights of due process and more lenient rules of evidence.”133
 
Dissenting Judge Stephen disagreed strongly134 and could not so 
distinguish Kostovski135 which he regarded as “clear guidance as to what are 
internationally recognised standards regarding the rights of the accused.”136  It 
may perhaps be seen as some-what odd that the majority in Tadić clearly felt 
130 Kostovski v Netherlands (1990) 12 EHRR 434. 
131 Ibid above n 130 para 69. 
132 Ibid, at para 71. 
133 Ibid, at para 28. 
134 Separate opinion of Judge Stephen, above n 39. 
135 Kostovski v Netherlands (1990) 12 EHRR 434. 
136 Ibid, see n 136. 
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that “internationally recognised standards” do not apply to their international 
tribunal.137
It was however the Kostovski138 case which clearly spelled out the danger 
of allowing witnesses anonymity when it stated that “testimony or other 
declarations inculpating an accused may well be designedly untruthful or 
simply erroneous and the defence will scarcely be able to bring this to light if 
it lacks the information permitting it to test the author's reliability or cast 
doubt on his credibility.”139  The ICTY in Tadić would have been well 
advised to have noted this more carefully. The dangers in granting anonymity 
were, as Geoffrey Robertson QC points out, “dramatically illustrated from the 
Tadić trial itself by the perjury of Witness L.”140
Witness L had been employed as a guard at Trnepolje camp,141 in which 
capacity he committed serious crimes for which he had been convicted by a 
court in Bosnia and Herzegovina.142  He was made available by the Bosnian 
authorities to give evidence for the prosecution in Tadić and was afforded 
anonymity and the pseudonym Witness L.143 He gave evidence of Tadić’s 
involvement in 12 rapes and 30 murders, including the murder of Witness L’s 
own father, whom -he saw murdered with his own eyes. In cross-examination, 
the defence asked “but isn’t your father still alive?” and then proceeded to 
produce an old man who “rushed in and embraced” the witness.  The 
prosecution “sheepishly” asked the court to disregard Witness L’s evidence in 
its entirety.144 The lessons to be learned from this are clear. 
 
137 The majority however clearly recognised these as being international standards of 
due process: “In drafting the Statute and the Rules every attempt was made to comply 
with internationally recognized standards of fundamental human rights. The Report of 
the Secretary-General emphasizes the importance of the International Tribunal in 
fully respecting such standards. (Report of the Secretary-General, above n 40, para. 
106.) The drafters of the Report recognized that ensuring that the proceedings before 
the International Tribunal were conducted in accordance with international standards 
of fair trial and due process was important not only to ensure respect for the 
individual rights of the accused, but also to ensure the legitimacy of the proceedings 
and to set a standard for proceedings before other ad hoc tribunals or a permanent 
international criminal court of the future.” 
138 Kostovski v Netherlands (1990) 12 EHRR 434. 
139 Ibid, at para 42. 
140 G Robertson Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice  (London: 
Penguin Books, 3rd edn, 2006) p 398. 
141 Internment Camp in Bosnia & Herzegovina during the early 1990s.  
142 Prosecutor v Tadić, No IT-94-1-T Decision on Prosecution Motion to Withdraw 
Protective Measures for Witness L 5 December 1996 available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/Tadić/trialc2/decision-e/61205pm2.htm. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid, pp 398 – 399. 
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(iii)  Exclusion of the Public 
 
Article 6 (1) ECHR provides that “in determination of his civil rights and 
obligations or any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair 
and public hearing…”145
The Strasbourg court has held this aspect as a “fundamental guarantee”146 
the purpose of which was made clear in Werner v Austria147 where the court 
said this: 
 
“…the public character of proceedings before judicial bodies referred 
to in Article 6(1) protects litigants against the administration of justice 
in secret with no public scrutiny; it is also one of the means whereby 
confidence in the courts, superior and inferior, can be maintained. By 
rendering the administration of justice visible, publicity contributes to 
the achievement of the aim of Article 6(1), namely a fair trial, the 
guarantee of which is one of the fundamental principles of any 
democratic society, within the meaning of the Convention.”148
 
The publicity requirement will apply to both civil and criminal 
proceedings, at trial court level.149  The Strasbourg authorities have also held 
that the right to a public hearing will apply to any phase in the proceedings;150 
however “in applying the publicity requirement…account must be taken of 
the entirety of the proceedings in the domestic legal order.”151
There are however extensive limitations on the right to a public hearing 
provided by the text of Article 6 itself where it is stated: 
 
“the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in 
the interests of morals, public order or national security in a 
democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection 
of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly 
necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where 
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.”152
 
145 Article 6 (1) European Convention on Human Rights. 
146 Sculer-Zgraggen v Switzerland (1993) 16 EHRR 405 at para 58. 
147 Werner v Austria Application No 21835/93 (1998) 26 EHRR 310. 
148 Ibid, at para 62. See also Diennet v France (1995) 21 EHRR 554 at para 33 and 
Pretto v Italy (1984) 6 EHRR 182 at para 21. 
149 Fredin v  Sweden (no. 2) Series A, No 283-A (1994) (1991) 13 EHRR 784. 
150 Axen v Federal Republic of Germany ECtHR Series A, 72 (1983). 
151 Ibid, at para 2. 
152 Article 6 (1) European Convention on Human Rights. 
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Any limitation of the right to a public hearing under Article 6 must be 
made on one of the grounds set out above.153  The provision also provides the 
need for a balance or test of proportionality.  However unlike some other 
Convention articles,154 the words ‘necessary in a democratic society’ are 
absent.  This is significant because it is these words which have been often 
cited by the Strasbourg court in leaving to Contracting States a “margin of 
appreciation”155 when interpreting Convention rights restrictively.156
There are no cases in which the court has adopted the margin of 
appreciation doctrine in respect of the right to a public hearing under Article 6 
(1).157 However it has been noted158 that a similar concept nevertheless 
applies and “the wording of the interests of justice restriction, in the opinion 
of the court clearly involves a margin of appreciation approach.”159  To that 
end the restrictions on the right to a public hearing exist not only in the text of 
Article 6, but the court’s jurisprudence also restricts the right and has further 
“diluted the Convention guarantee.”160   
The exclusion of the public was considered permissible on the grounds of 
“public order” and the court had regard to the issue of proportionality, in 
Campbell and Fell v UK.161  Here the Respondent argued that there was a 
necessity to hold prison disciplinary hearings in camera due to security 
problems in either allowing the public access to, or transporting prisoner 
from, the prison precincts.  The court held that the imposition of public 
hearings “would impose a disproportionate burden on the authorities of the 
State”162 and proceedings in camera were thus justified “for reasons of public 
order and security.”163
153 Gautrin and Others v France (1999) 28 EHRR 196 (38/1997/822/1025-1028). 
154 Articles 8-11 all contain the words “necessary in a democratic society”.  
155 The margin of appreciation allows “a degree of latitude to States as to how they 
protect the individual rights set out in the Convention. The margin has been held to be 
especially important in areas where there is said to be an absence of consensus or 
common practice across Europe…” (Lewis T “What Not to Wear: Religious Rights, 
the European Court, and the Margin of Appreciation” (2007) 56 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 395). 
156 For example see Leyla Şahin v Turkey (application no 44774/98) or the discussion 
in G Letsas “Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation” (2006) 26 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 705. 
157 See Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick Law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (London: Butterworths, 1995). 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid p 218. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Campbell and Fell v UK [1985] 7 EHRR 165, Series A No 48. 
162  Ibid. 
163 Ibid. 
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In X v UK164 the Irish applicant was convicted of the terrorist murder of 
two British soldiers in Belfast.  The screening of witnesses from the public 
was held permissible on ‘public order’ grounds and the court observed that 
“the interference with the right to publicity was kept to a minimum by the fact 
that the public was not excluded from the proceedings and could hear all the 
questions put to and answers given by the witnesses…The screening was in 
the interests of public order or national security and to the extent strictly 
required in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity 
would prejudice the interests of justice.”165
In a number of cases, the Strasbourg authorities have upheld restrictions 
on the right to a public hearing on the basis of protecting “the interests of the 
parties.” Trials in camera have been upheld in medical disciplinary 
proceedings in order to protect the “private life of the parties,” which 
presumably means the medical professionals and the patients, although in 
Diennett v France166 the court held that “such an occurrence must be strictly 
required by the circumstances.”167
In B v UK168 the court held that the exclusion of the public was justified in 
divorce proceedings “in the interests of justice and to ensure that the privacy 
of children is protected.”169  It may of course be argued that in criminal 
proceedings a higher threshold should be applied.  However the court made 
clear that “even in a criminal law context where there is a high expectation of 
publicity, it may on occasion be necessary under Article 6 to limit the open 
and public nature of proceedings in order, for example, to protect the safety or 
privacy of witnesses or to promote the free exchange of information and 
opinion in the pursuit of justice.”170  Such an occasion arose in X v Austria171 
where the exclusion of the public in criminal proceedings involving sexual 
offences against minors was permitted under Article 6 (1).  Presumably this 
164 X v United Kingdom App No 20657/92 (1993) 15 EHRR CD113. 
165 Ibid, at para 1. 
166 Diennet v France (1996) 21 EHRR 554. 
167 Ibid at para 34. See also L v Finland (25651/94) [2000] 1 FLR 118; Jurisic v 
Austria (App no 62539/00) 2006 ECHR.  The court in Diennet found that ‘while the 
need to protect professional confidentiality and the private lives of patients may 
justify holding proceedings in camera, such an occurrence must be strictly required by 
the circumstances. No such justification existed in the instant case and accordingly 
there had been a breach of Art 6 (1). 
168 B v United Kingdom. P v United Kingdom Application Nos 36337/97 and 
35974/97 (2002) 34 EHRR 19. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Ibid at para H7 (c). 
171 X v Austria, No 1913/63, 2 Digest 438 (1965). 
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was done on the Article 6 (1) grounds of in the “interests of juveniles” 
although the court did not specify as to which restriction it was applying.172  
It has been argued that the importance of a public hearing is even more 
pronounced in the context of war crimes and violations of human rights 
law,173 although as with anonymity it is not an issue that the Strasbourg court 
has addressed.  Further, the Strasbourg authorities are concerned not so much 
by the seriousness of a given crime, but look more to the grounds on which a 
restriction is made, and to that end whether Article 6 (1) applies.  The court in 
Gautrin174 held that where none of the restrictions apply, no violation will be 
found.175   
ECHR compatibility with the exclusion of the public in a war crimes 
context has however been considered on a number of occasions by the 
Bosnian State Court.  Bosnia & Herzegovina has signed, ratified and is bound 
by the ECHR.176As discussed above, the Bosnian court has adopted a broad 
use of exclusion of the public and media from trial proceedings. In 
Samardžić177 and Stanković,178 proceedings were held “almost entirely in 
closed session.”179   
The court in Stanković excluded the public on the grounds of “the 
protection of the private life of the parties”, which is of course one of the 
restrictions under Article 6 (1).  The court of First Instance said this: 
 
“in the opinion of the Panel [exclusion of the public] was necessary to 
preserve morality and protect the personal and intimate life of the 
injured parties and the interests of the witnesses, given that these are 
witnesses who should testify in respect to a great number of rapes and 
other humiliating proceedings, which might appear to tarnish their 
reputation and damage family life, that majority of them were very 
young at the time of the commission of the criminal offence who, in 
the meantime founded their families and have now personal and 
family life.  Testifying in public about such delicate and sensitive 
matters, even with certain measures of protection, in the opinion of the 
172 Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
(London: Butterworths, 1995). 
173 See R Dicker and B Adams “Letter to the Secretariat of the Rules and Procedure 
Committee” Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia, Human Rights 
Watch November 17, 2006.  Available at 
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/ij/cambodia1106/#_ftn43. 
174 Gautrin and Others v France (38/1997/822/1025-1028). 
175 Ibid, at paras 42-43. 
176 Ibid n 25.   
177 Prosecutor v  Samardzic. Case No X-KR-05/49. 
178 Prosecutor v  Stankovic  Case No X-KR-05/70. 
179 Human Rights Watch, above n 17, IV. Witness Protection and Support. 
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court, always presents a risk for private and personal lives of the 
witnesses – victims, because in a small community a not controlled 
small detail of the story might be enough to reveal the identity of the 
protected witnesses.”180
 
On appeal the Appellate Panel found the First Instance Panel “took into 
account the need to strike a balance between the rights of the accused to a 
public trial and the protection of morality and interests of the witnesses…”181 
On that basis the court found the test had been “correctly and fully 
applied.”182
Although applying a restriction expressly provided by the text of Article 6 
(1), in neither ruling did the court give any detailed assessment of the 
Strasbourg authorities discussed above.  Instead it appeared to be relying on 
the text in Article 6 (1) itself.  This is not wrong and does not in itself render 
the decisions in any way unreliable; however many of the Strasbourg cases 
include powerful statements as to the high level of importance to which the 
right to a public hearing is held.    
It may be argued that such consideration was missed by the Bosnian court 
and it has been pointed out that the necessity of applying such restrictive 
measures is questionable.183 In Janković;184 - a case decided less than a year 
after Stanković and also involving serious breaches of human rights law,185 
the proceedings were conducted “almost entirely in open session”.186  
Significantly some of the witnesses giving evidence also testified in the 
Samardžić and Stanković cases, under protective status.187  This raises the 
question as to how necessary it could really have been to exclude the public 
from the entire proceedings “as a rule” in Stanković, 188 if it was not strictly 
necessary less than a year later in Janković.   
180 Stanković, above n 76. 
181 Prosecutor v Stanković Case No X-KR-05/70 Appellate Decision of 28 March 
2007  p 7. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Human Rights Watch, above n 18, IV. Witness Protection and Support. 
184 Prosecutor v Janković Case No X-KR-05/161. 
185 Gojko Janković was charged on indictment dated 27.06.2006 with Crimes against 
Humanity contrary to Article 172. 
186 Human Rights Watch, above n 18, IV. Witness Protection and Support. 
187 Ibid: “There were seven overlapping witnesses between the Janković and 
Stanković cases, and at least five overlapping witnesses with the Samardžić case. 
Human Rights Watch interview with Special Department for War Crimes staff, 
Sarajevo, September 27, 2006; Human Rights Watch telephone interview with 
Special Department for War Crimes staff, Sarajevo, November 30, 2006.  
188 Above n 76. 
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The court in Stanković did appear to consider the application of less 
restrictive measures, but concluded that the risk to the witnesses would remain 
“even with certain measures of protection.”189  The court did not state what 
measures it had in mind. 
To the court’s credit, as noted above, measures to protect the accused 
when the public was excluded were put in place - trial monitors and 
representatives from the OSCE190 were present throughout.191 Nevertheless 
the removal of the public from the entire proceedings in a serious criminal 
trial is an extreme measure.   The Strasbourg court has upheld restrictions 
where the risk to the witnesses on the face of it appears less than to those 
giving evidence in Stanković, and where the restriction specified under Article 
6 (1) has been the same.192  However for the removal of the public to be 
permitted under Article 6 (1) it is likely the Strasbourg court would require 
the highest levels of necessity given the extensive restrictions applied. 
 
THE BROADER PURPOSE OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS  
 
The use of anonymity and closed sessions at the ICTY and the War 
Crimes Chamber have been controversial because of their impact on the rights 
of the accused.  However, in the case of war crimes trials and the prosecution 
of extreme violations of human rights, the debate takes on broader 
dimensions.  The debate concerns not only the rights of the accused, but also 
special considerations for victims and the impact of such trials on the wider 
community in post-conflict societies.  It raises the question of what the 
predominant purpose of such trials is.   
If the purpose is determining the guilt or innocence of those accused of 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and or genocide, then the same 
arguments made concerning the rights of the accused are valid.  The ability of 
the accused to effectively cross-examine witnesses and put forth an informed 
189 Ibid above n 190. 
190 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has monitored a great 
many of the trials at the Bosnian State Court.  For their most recent report see OSCE 
Report: War Crimes Trials Before the Domestic Courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
Progress and Obstacles.  March 2005. 
191 See Stanković, above n 76. 
192 For example in divorce or medical disciplinary proceedings see Diennet v France 
(1995) 21 EHRR 554; B v United Kingdom, P v United Kingdom Application Nos 
36337/97 and 35974/97 (2002) 34 EHRR 19; Guenon v France No 13652/88 66 DR 
181 (1990) and Imberechts v Belgium No 15561/89 69 DR 312 (1991).  
THE PROTECTION OF WITNESSES IN BOSNIAN WAR CRIMES 
TRIALS 
84 
                                                     
defence; and public scrutiny of testimony, contribute to ascertaining the truth 
and assessing innocence or guilt to the required level of certainty.193
If the purpose is to ameliorate suffering and to contribute to the healing 
process for victims and witnesses, efforts must be made to minimise any 
trauma and insecurity associated with testifying.  There is a great deal of 
literature which discusses the retraumatisation of a victim from having to 
confront her alleged rapist in trial, describe what he did to her and face hostile 
defence questioning. Further, many rape victims feel guilt and shame as well 
as fear of rejection by their husband or family and fear of reprisals against 
themselves and their families.194   
In Tadić, the Trial Chamber emphasised that standards designed to apply 
to “ordinary criminal and … civil adjudications” were not appropriate for 
adjudicating crimes “so horrific as to warrant universal jurisdiction.”195  As 
discussed above, the drafters of the ICTY Statute also seem to have 
recognised the unique nature of such crimes by imposing a positive obligation 
to provide protection to victims and witnesses in Article 21(2) and Article 
22.196  Failure to protect witnesses from trauma and to ensure their safety 
through appropriate protective measures would undercut the purpose  
identified here. Such measures could arguably involve non-disclosure of their 
identity to the public, and in extreme cases, to the accused.  Failure to protect 
witnesses could also result in the unwillingness of witnesses to testify, which 
in turn, could prevent the prosecution of those accused.  This would undercut 
the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of alleged perpetrators.197
If the purpose is to establish a historical record of the war and to educate, 
the unwillingness of witnesses to tell their experiences due to insufficient 
protection would also undercut this purpose.  However, some witness  
protective measures could also undermine the establishment of such a record.  
Non-disclosure of witness identities to the accused and lack of public scrutiny 
of witness testimony, as discussed, can impede truth gathering and the 
development of an accurate historical record.  In addition, closed sessions 
impede the development of public knowledge, education and 
understanding.198  Furthermore, trial transcripts and judgments filled with 
193 See Pozen, above n 1 at 291 and 320; McLaughlin, above n 28 at 207; Leigh, 
above n 28 at 80-81; Human Rights Watch, above n 18 at 31 and above n 24 at 31; 
Creta, above n 28 at 400. 
194 See Chinkin, above n 29 at 75 and 78; Lakatos, above n 29 at 919.   
195 Tadić, above n 15 at para 28. 
196 Ibid; see also Affolder, above n 34 at 455. 
197 Chinkin, above n 29 at 76; Lakatos, above n 29 at 920-921; Doak, above n 29 at 
21. 
198 See Human Rights Watch, above n 18 at 31; Creta, above n 28 at 400. 
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redactions and pseudonyms create an unclear and incomplete record of 
events.199
If the purpose is to establish rule of law and confidence in the judicial 
system, then the trials and the institutions in which they are conducted must 
be deemed legitimate.  Anonymity and concerns about the rights of the 
accused undermine confidence in the system and the belief that justice is 
being done.200  In addition, the broad use of closed sessions can negatively 
impact public perception and confidence. Public and transparent proceedings 
contribute to confidence in the system and allow the public to assess whether 
the trial is in fact objective and fair;201 and knowledge of a witness’ identity 
gives more legitimacy to the specific trial.202  For example the trial of General 
Blaškić was of great public interest in Croatia and was reported throughout 
the country.  The use of anonymous witnesses would have raised public 
criticism of the trial.203  Public confidence in the criminal justice system and 
the legitimacy of justice institutions is especially important in post-conflict 
societies, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, because of the acknowledged 
deficiencies in the justice system during the war and immediately thereafter.  
The War Crimes Chamber was created in part to address these deficiencies 
and contribute to rule of law in BiH.204
Ultimately, to be considered legitimate, war crimes trials must comply 
with international law.  The various aims of such trials and the particular 
contexts in which they are conducted must be given necessary attention, but 
within the framework of established international standards.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The balance between the interests of victims and the rights of the accused 
is a difficult one to strike.  The arguments in favour of applying restrictive 
measures to protect victims and witnesses are strong and often compelling.  
This is compounded by the issues that arose in the Bosnian war crimes trials.  
The ferocity of the conflict and brutality of the acts committed has made the 
situation particularly difficult.  Many of the crimes have been of a sexual 
nature. The size of the country and close proximity of its communities makes 
the need to protect the victims an especially sensitive and particularly 
important task. 
199 Pozen, above n 1, at 319-320. 
200 Doak, above n 29 at 17. 
201 Human Rights Watch, above n 18, at 31-32; Pozen, above n 1, at 313. 
202 Human Rights Watch, above n 18, at 31-32. 
203 DeFrancia, above n 54, at 1418. 
204 Human Rights Watch, above n 18, at 31-32. 
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However, the defendant’s right to a fair trial is one of the corner stones of 
justice in a democratic society.  It is an historic right that should not be 
subordinated to the issue of protecting witnesses.  As the Strasbourg court has 
made clear “the right to a fair administration of justice holds so prominent in 
democratic society that it cannot be sacrificed.”205
For a fair balance to be found due weight must be given to each side, 
without compromising the other.  The ICTY and WCC have not always struck 
this balance.  Arguably both courts have overly compensated in protecting the 
interests of victims and have adversely impacted the rights of the accused.  A 
common theme where the courts have failed to strike an appropriate balance is 
that significant weight is placed on protecting the victims and witnesses  
whilst insufficient regard is placed on the rights of the accused.  Arguments 
that war crimes are unique and exceptional situations are relied on heavily in 
justifying departure from internationally accepted standards of due process.  
War crimes trials are unique and exceptional, but just as this is an argument 
that special consideration should be given to victims and witnesses, so it 
requires that standards of due process and the right to a fair trial are 
heightened in their importance also.  Where this is forgotten a fair balance 
will not be found. 
The Strasbourg court has principally held that although the rights of the 
defence may be limited in certain situations this must be strictly necessary and 
done by the least restrictive means possible.  These principles are not easily 
detected in the rulings discussed above in Tadić and Stanković.  Although 
both the ICTY and WCC have shown a shift towards a more proportionate 
approach to the competing rights of victims and defendants, there is a clear 
potential for further conflict to arise.  The words ‘strictly necessary’ and by 
the ‘least restrictive means’ possible’ should be evaluated with great care and 
narrowly applied. 
205 Above n 90, at para 30. 
